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Based on our observations in the field and insights 
from referenced sources, we aimed to identify key 
experiences of community engagement and social 
mobilization efforts in the recent Ebola response in 
West Africa. These experiences were based on the 
approach of the Ebola response, the role played 
by anthropologists, the style of communication, 
community resistance, and cross-border and urban 
challenges. The community engagement and social 
mobilization activities were led by United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and United Nations 
Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) 
and had an operational cadre of ‘social mobilizers’ 
that were employed by different agencies as field 
workers at the district and community levels. Their 
purpose was to assist with communication, training, 
stakeholder engagement, and the mobilization and 
coordination of targeted interventions such as ‘lock-
downs’. To bring the different partners together in a 
common platform at the national level, a community 
engagement and social mobilization ‘pillar’ was 
established in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea. 
The pillar met on a regular basis to better plan, 
to coordinate, to mediate between agencies, and 
to facilitate the delivery of activities and the 
policy response to a rapidly changing situation. We 
have interpreted that community engagement and 
social mobilization efforts are closely linked to 
a health promotion practice that recognizes the 
value of including local people in planning and 
implementation, and that seeks to listen to and 
respond to the expressed needs of communities. This 
is called a ‘bottom-up approach’.
The Ebola response
The ongoing outbreak of Ebola virus disease in 
West Africa is the largest on record, with a mortality 
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Key experiences of community engagement and social mobilization 
in the Ebola response
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Abstract: The ongoing outbreak of the Ebola virus in West Africa is the largest on record; it has 
undermined already fragile healthcare systems and presented new challenges to contain the spread of 
the disease. Based on our observations in the field and insights from referenced sources, we aimed to 
identify key experiences of community engagement and social mobilization efforts in the current 
Ebola response. We concluded that there is no excuse not to actively involve local people and that the 
United Nations (UN) agencies and other partners did learn from their earlier mistakes to make a 
genuine attempt to better engage with communities. However, bottom-up approaches have not been 
widely implemented during the response and the reasons for not doing so must be further assessed. 
Health promotion can make an important contribution, because it shows how to enable people to 
take more control over their lives and health. This commentary can provide a guide to agencies to 
understand an appropriate way forward when the next Ebola outbreak inevitably occurs. (Global 
Health Promotion, 2016; 23(1): 79–82)
Keywords: anthropologists, community action, community engagement, community resistance, 
disease management, Ebola, health promotion, outbreak response, public health, social mobilization
Commentary
G. Laverack and E. Manoncourt80
IUHPE – Global Health Promotion Vol. 23, No. 1 2016
rate of approximately 70% and an unprecedented 
number of reported cases (n = 27,479 at 24 June 
2015) and deaths (n = 11,222 at 24 June 2015) (1). 
The outbreak had had a rapid transmission of the 
disease within and across the countries of Guinea, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone. The epidemic undermined 
already fragile healthcare relationships and systems, 
and presented challenges to contain the spread of 
the disease and to develop new prevention and 
treatment options. The task of managing the 
outbreak was initially left to national governments 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but 
as the epidemic continued to accelerate, it became 
apparent that the disease posed a bigger threat; and 
this triggered a global United Nations (UN)-led 
response. With many organizations being deployed 
on the ground, the first priority of sufficient beds for 
patients was soon met; and the focus shifted to 
surveillance, case management, safe burials, contact-
tracing and to a lesser extent, community engagement 
and social mobilization.
The initial ‘getting to zero’ strategy was top-down 
and driven by epidemiological data and the perceived 
need to treat Ebola patients. The reported number of 
cases continued to increase and more severe measures 
began to follow; for example, in Sierra Leone on 19 
September 2014 a three-day stay-at-home or lock-
down period was enforced, with the threat of fines or 
jail if violated. During the stay-at-home period, social 
mobilizers went door to door in search of people 
showing symptoms of infection, providing information 
and giving out resources such as soap. In this manner, 
263 cases of Ebola were identified and families and 
communities were quarantined, leading to food 
shortages and disrupted trade. Unsurprisingly, people 
continued to violate the quarantine requirements. The 
government decided to implement a modified three-
day stay-at-home intervention in March 2015 which 
allowed people to attend prayers. This received more 
cooperation from the general population, as they 
sensed the end of the Ebola outbreak.
At an early stage in the epidemic, many community 
leaders recognized the value of prevention as the best 
strategy to curtail the disease, including improved 
hygiene, local surveillance, self-imposed quarantine 
and the community management of burials. Chiefdoms 
in Kono, Sierra Leone, for example, wanted their own 
burial teams to counter the culturally insensitive 
handling of their dead. Communities also wanted 
community Ebola cemeteries where they could bury 
their dead, so future generations would have a 
referential ancestral burial site (2). Self-imposed 
quarantine proved to be an important factor in Ebola 
control, especially when it was led by local and 
religious leaders. It is crucial to minimize quarantine 
violations, as well as to trace contacts and new cases. 
The reliable delivery of resources was also an essential 
part of building community-led self-imposed 
quarantine, which included food, water, money 
and information (3). Coercion was found to be 
counterproductive after the negative repercussions of 
using large-scale forced quarantines controlled by the 
military, for example, in Liberia. The coercion was 
responsible for breaking down the trust that was 
required for successful community engagement (4).
The role of anthropology
Anthropological insights can significantly contribute 
to Ebola control, because they take into account local 
perspectives and help us to understand the complexity 
of the problem (for example, in regard to notions of 
purity, pollution and the exchange of bodily fluids); 
however, we observed that anthropological insights 
were not widely used in the ongoing Ebola response. 
Anthropological studies require in-depth and 
sometimes long-term input, whereas in a crisis 
response, new information is required quickly as the 
situation changes, often on a daily basis. We found that 
anthropological insight can provide useful information 
at the beginning of the outbreak; as the response 
progresses, however, it is the ‘quick and dirty’ studies, 
often produced by epidemiologists and social scientists, 
which can best meet the requirements of rapidly 
changing circumstances. For example, a rapid 
assessment of the siting and construction of Community 
Care Centers in Sierra Leone found that the fears of 
communities were quickly alleviated when they had 
been actively engaged in decisions (5).
We also found that anthropologists are trained to 
provide ‘thick and dense’ accounts, which are difficult 
to translate into practical recommendations, com-
pounded by a poor understanding of how programs 
function. Anthropological recommendations, when 
they were provided, were sometimes disregarded for 
being too vague. The missing link has been a 
discussion between the program manager and the 
anthropologist, or an intermediary who could 
provide an interpretation of the practical relevance of 
the findings.
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The communication approach
The findings from the Knowledge, Attitude and 
Practice surveys in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
suggested that knowledge levels about the 
transmission of the disease were consistently high, 
often above 90%. This is an endorsement of the 
communication approach used in the Ebola 
response: a combination of mass media, print 
materials and face-to-face communication. We 
observed that each country used a different variation 
on this approach. Liberia applied the principles of 
the Communication for Development (C4D) 
approach, social behavior change communication 
and information, education and communication 
techniques. Sierra Leone also used C4D, with a 
mixed-methods approach, strong on messaging and 
print materials. Guinea was the exception: it relied 
on the use of the radio and the Community Watch 
Committees or ‘comité de veille’, a community-
based approach that in practice did not seemingly 
deliver what was expected.
The rapid establishment and scale-up of more 
than 2000 Community Watch Committees 
throughout the country strained the monitoring and 
supervision by both the government and its 
implementing partners. Our estimation in the field 
suggested that only 25% of the Community Watch 
Committees were functional, and that guidance on 
community representation was not always respected 
by local leaders. There were exceptions, notably the 
Social Mobilization Action Consortium in Sierra 
Leone, which did develop a ‘community-led Ebola 
approach’ to trigger local action; however, the 
predominant communication approach relied on 
the mass media, refined messaging and interpersonal 
contact through thousands of social mobilizers. The 
quality and coverage of the interpersonal 
communication was variable, and was sometimes 
carried out without sufficient discussion of the key 
concerns.
The mass media approach was successful in Sierra 
Leone, Liberia and Guinea in reaching a large 
number of households to raise awareness; however, 
as the outbreak progressed, the response was too 
slow to adapt to a more targeted approach, to 
engage people in a dialogue to address deep-seated 
practices – in particular, those that continued to 
allow the transmission of the disease, including the 
hiding of sick people and dead bodies, and unsafe 
burial practices. We observed that one reason why 
the outbreak has persisted may have been that 
overall, the response did not deliver bottom-up 
approaches that could build a dialogue and promote 
self-management, to convince those families and 
communities that were unwilling to change their 
traditional practices.
Community resistance and rumors
Non-compliant behavior was observed to be part 
of a cycle of unwillingness to change traditional 
practices that can be compounded by experiences of 
poor service delivery and weak information flow (for 
example, a lack of support for quarantined families 
and patients). This can then create an atmosphere 
of mistrust, fear, resistance and non-compliance. 
Building a narrative of trust through communication 
is difficult; ideally, community confidence should be 
maintained from the beginning through bottom-up 
approaches that include a respect for local 
perspectives. Community resistance was a key issue 
in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone; as the outbreak 
continued, we observed that the nature of the 
resistance changed. For example, although the total 
number of incidents across Guinea decreased, the 
level of violence increased and continued to be 
confined to specific areas. The exact causes of 
resistance were unclear, but appeared to be a 
combination of rumor, misinformation and poor 
professional practice. Later in the response, efforts to 
collect and analyze rumors were initiated by 
Internews in Liberia, and this showed that people 
continued to be concerned about government 
interventions such as decommissioning, vaccinations, 
and back-to-school and other transition activities (6).
Urban and cross-border issues
Epidemiological data have correctly projected that 
the disease will recede into urban areas during the 
final phases of the outbreak; however, we observed 
that an alternative strategy to the ongoing rural-
based communication approach was not developed 
in any of the three countries. The urban and rural 
contexts present unique challenges; and the response 
could learn valuable lessons from, for example, the 
UNMEER/UN-Habitat intervention in Montserrado, 
Monrovia, and approaches that engage local officials 
within administrative boundaries in urban areas.
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In West Africa, international borders are 
porous and artificially separate closely interwoven 
communities linked by common languages, ethnicity, 
cultural traditions and access to markets. The cross-
border movement of people is inevitable; whilst the 
closing of official border crossings had prevented 
motor vehicle traffic, foot and bicycle traffic 
has never stopped, and may even have increased 
in the remote areas, acting as a potential source 
of transmission. We observed that a systematic 
community management approach to record travel 
histories, contacts and symptoms of illness in the 
cross-border areas would improve the situation (for 
example, engaging with village chiefs in cross-
border control is critical to organize patrols of the 
boundaries of their villages, to keep outsiders away 
and to record people’s movements).
Conclusion
We conclude that Ebola control efforts must 
actively involve people and this is critical to success. 
The lead agencies did learn from their earlier mistakes 
in the present outbreak and have made a genuine 
attempt to better engage with communities; however, 
bottom-up approaches have not been widely 
implemented and this may lie in an agency preference 
to use pre-packaged and top-down approaches, which 
have an emphasis on behavior change communication. 
This raises concerns about whether or not the lessons 
on the success of community engagement have really 
been learned, or if top-down approaches will continue 
to dominate responses of the future. Commentators 
have suggested that top-down tactics have had a 
questionable effect, potentially worsening the 
epidemic, and contributing to a greater social and 
economic burden in West Africa (7).
The emerging evidence from the current Ebola 
response suggested that communities have 
understood what is required and can learn rapidly 
to change high-risk traditional practices to help to 
reduce transmission. In particular, community 
engagement can offer an added value through the 
self-management of quarantines, control of cross-
border movement, safe and dignified burials, and 
the siting of Community Care Centers. Plainly put, 
there is no excuse not to actively involve local people 
in an Ebola response and the reasons for not doing 
so must be assessed, including any assumptions 
about local ignorance, weak capacity, and the lack 
of trust between agencies and communities. Health 
promotion can make an important contribution, 
because it shows how to enable people to take more 
control over their lives and health. Community 
capacity building, participation and empowerment 
are already intrinsic to a health promotion practice 
that recognizes the value of a bottom-up approach. 
This can provide a guide to agencies to understand 
an appropriate way forward when the next Ebola 
outbreak inevitably occurs.
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